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Arendt After JerusAlem
Graham MacPhee
Hannah Arendt, The Last Interview and Other Conversations, New York and 
London, Melville House 2013, 136pp; $15.95 paperback
Marie Luise Knott, Unlearning with Hannah Arendt, D. Dollenmayer (trans.), 
New York, Other Press 2014, 173pp; $22.95 hardback
Bettina Stangneth, Eichmann Before Jerusalem: The Unexamined Life of a Mass 
Murderer, R. Martin (trans.), New York, Alfred A. Knopf 2014; $35.00 hardback
Walter Benjamin’s insight into the interpretative effect of historical duration 
is perhaps nowhere more strikingly borne out than in the case of Hannah 
Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963). As Benjamin observed, ‘the history 
of works prepares for their critique’, for over time ‘the concrete realities rise 
up … all the more distinctly the more they die out in the world’, and ‘the 
interpretation of what is striking and curious … becomes the prerequisite for 
any later critic’.1 Famously, what continues to prove so ‘striking and curious’ 
about Arendt’s report on the trial of Adolf Eichmann is her invention of a 
new political category for modernity, ‘the banality of evil’. Yet the nature of 
the controversy surrounding Arendt’s coinage has changed over time. Where 
the phrase was initially taken by its critics to imply a sneering disregard for 
the plight of the victims of the Holocaust and an arrogant dismissal of the 
monstrosity of the perpetrators, as Roger Berkowitz argues, a ‘new consensus’ 
has subsequently emerged. This ‘holds that Arendt was right in her general 
claim’ about the recasting of the conditions of evil in modernity, but ‘wrong 
about Eichmann in particular’.2 On this view, Arendt may be credited with a 
larger theoretical insight, but her text is marred by her naive acceptance of 
the lie of Eichmann’s smallness. With hindsight, Eichmann can now be seen 
as a shrewd operator who skilfully duped Arendt by downplaying his own 
deeply held ideological commitment and fanatical anti-Semitism. But, as 
Benjamin would surely object, the historical material through which Arendt 
constructs her theoretical optic cannot be dispensed with so lightly. For the 
constellation that gave her the ‘banality of evil’ depends on the challenge that 
the historicity of the figure of Eichmann poses for the application of Kantian 
moral universality. That is, the constellation comprises the ongoing interplay 
of conceptual framing and historical events as they are reconfigured in the 
perpetual readjustment of viewpoint over time. The attempt simply to iron 
out the difficulties of Arendt’s text forfeits the opportunity to develop the 
meaning of this radically unsettling political concept.
 All three books considered here provide important new insights for 
Anglophone readers into Arendt’s rethinking of evil in modernity - although 
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perhaps not always as their authors may have intended. The studies of 
Eichmann and Arendt are both translations of recent books by German 
intellectuals who work outside of academic institutions and consequently they 
exhibit a level of freedom from standard generic and stylistic conventions, 
albeit in different ways and to different effects. The translation of Bettina 
Stangneth’s Eichmann Before Jerusalem: The Unexamined Life of a Mass 
Murderer has been long awaited for its dogged pursuit of the archival record 
of Eichmann’s career up to his appearance in the Jerusalem courtroom. 
Stangneth’s study marshals this historical material to craft a sustained analysis 
of Eichmann’s self-presentation through interviews, his own writings, and 
activities designed to shape his public image. This focus on Eichmann’s self-
presentation provides the basis for a running engagement with Arendt that 
is designed, according to the dust jacket blurb, to ‘permanently challeng[e]’ 
her ‘notion of the “banality of evil”’. Marie Luise Knott’s Unlearning with 
Hannah Arendt seeks to restore the temporally situated character of Arendt’s 
work in a different way, by returning to Arendt’s own concern for the public 
life of thinking in language. Knott’s approach is original and intellectually 
insightful while managing to exhibit the very playfulness and accessibility 
that she sees in Arendt’s own writing. The book pulls off a remarkable feat 
in that both the seasoned scholar and the newcomer to Arendt will come 
away with an enlivened sense of the inventiveness of her thinking and her 
poetic sensitivity to the intersubjective happening of language - its role in 
constituting what Arendt calls ‘the world’.
 The other text included here, Melville House’s The Last Interview and Other 
Conversations, brings together translations of four interviews with Arendt in 
an inexpensive and efficient format. Two of the interviews, by Günter Gaus 
in 1964 and Adelbert Reif in 1970, are already available in English. However, 
the interview by Jaochim Fest in 1964 and Arendt’s last interview conducted 
in October 1973 by Roger Errera appear here in full translation for the first 
time (the latter appeared in partial translation in the second issue of the 
Arendt Newsletter). The three interviews by Gaus, Fest and Errera all engage 
with the figure of Eichmann and the reception of Eichmann in Jerusalem, and, 
interestingly, Knott’s book draws on these interviews extensively. Indeed, the 
interviews with Fest and Errera in particular do more than just chart Arendt’s 
response to the controversy surrounding her book; they also offer invaluable 
insights into her continued thinking and rethinking of the banality of evil. 
Having translations of these interviews together in a single volume provides a 
helpful and highly usable resource for English-speaking scholars and students.
 Stangneth’s Eichmann Before Jerusalem draws a compelling picture of 
Eichmann’s life prior to his abduction and rendition to Israel that emphasises 
his unrelenting activity as an artificer of his own self-image. The most telling 
sections relate to the project of ideological renewal and self-justification that 
he embarked upon after reaching Argentina in 1950. As well as attempting to 
become a fully-fledged author, Eichmann played a central if uneasy role in an 
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extended series of recorded interviews conducted by Willem Sassen, a Dutch 
collaborator and SS propagandist who for a while successfully reinvented 
himself as a journalist. Sassen attempted to enlist Eichmann in an elaborate 
programme of Holocaust denial aimed at securing the political rehabilitation 
of National Socialism in the context of Cold War anti-Communism. Stangneth 
painstakingly traces the twists and turns that led to the collapse of this 
programme, which ran aground on the fundamental divergence between 
their respective strategies of deception. Although Eichmann shared Sassen’s 
goal of rehabilitating Nazism as an operative political force, his closeness to 
the mechanics and scale of the Final Solution meant that he realised that 
outright denial was simply implausible. Instead, his strategy was to minimise 
the number of victims - ‘fewer than a million’ (p208) - and frame their deaths 
in terms of the necessities shared by all sides within the new condition of total, 
global war (pp216-18). But for Sassen, this insistence on the necessity of mass 
murder (albeit scandalously diminished and rationalised) undermined the 
whole stratagem of Holocaust denial, and Eichmann’s testimony, recorded 
and duly transcribed, became a toxic liability.
 Eichmann Before Jerusalem draws two methodological conclusions from 
this historical reconstruction. First, that Eichmann was a master liar on 
a scale that has never been adequately understood, a specialist not in 
Hebrew and Judaic culture as he once claimed, but in the art and strategy of 
deception. Second, that because the Argentinian documents were never fully 
disclosed at the trial (although portions were available to the prosecution, 
and passages from the Sassen interviews were published in Life magazine), 
there is a fundamental disparity between ‘Eichmann-in-Argentina’ and 
‘Eichmann-in-Jerusalem’ (p397). 
 Stangneth’s point is not that one is unproblematically true or unmediated, 
since in her view this is never the case with Eichmann. It is rather that the 
disparities between the strategies of deceit employed successively in Argentina 
and then in Jerusalem testify to Eichmann’s consciousness of criminal intent, 
his ideological commitment, and his zealous anti-Semitism, without the need 
to establish exhaustive proof of his inner feelings or sincere intentions. For 
Stangneth, Eichmann’s exorbitant and all-consuming will to lie catches him 
out, revealing an ‘ideological warrior’ (p268) whose desire for domination 
was fuelled by a deeply held and worryingly coherent system of ‘totalitarian 
thought’ (p222).
 Stangneth’s challenge to Arendt therefore involves more than simply the 
addition of new historical materials. More seriously, Stangneth charges that 
Arendt misunderstood what she could see of Eichmann and his worldview. 
Although Arendt realised that Eichmann was ‘deliberately posturing’, she 
fatally ‘drew the wrong conclusion, imagining the main reason … was foppish 
vanity and a lack of rhetorical skill and philosophical knowledge’ (p220). For 
Stangneth, this was not simply a personal underestimation of Eichmann’s 
character. Rather it was an intellectual misjudgement that lead Arendt to ‘an 
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overhasty and dangerous’ (p219) dismissal of the coherence and power of 
the ideological project pursued by Eichmann and other unregenerate Nazis 
like Sassen:
Although Hannah Arendt may have been right to point out the ‘macabre 
humour’ with which horror sometimes tips over into comedy, in light of 
the Argentine documents, her characterization of Eichmann’s ‘inability 
to speak’ and ‘inability to think’ seems insupportable. Eichmann’s words 
in Argentina … weren’t thoughtless drivel but consistent speech based on 
a complete system of thought (pp267-68).
For Stangneth, Arendt’s conception of ‘thoughtlessness’3 dismisses Nazi 
ideology as ‘pseudo-philosophy’ and exempts her own philosophical vantage 
point from investigation by inadvertently implying that ‘philosophy is … 
automatically good’ (p221). As such, Arendt is seen as renouncing the project 
of philosophical renewal required to guard against the totalitarian impulse 
in thought.
 Yet for all the attention Stangneth pays to Eichmann’s self-narration 
and self-presentation, she seems curiously unaware of Arendt’s persistent 
and penetrating concern for the public life of thinking in language. 
Notwithstanding the important historical reconstruction undertaken in 
Eichmann Before Jerusalem, the broader claims it makes rest on an oddly 
restricted and nonphilosphical interpretation of Arendt’s text that separates 
it from other aspects of her thinking and from the wider intellectual culture 
with which it was always in dialogue. This disconnection subordinates the 
conceptual and interpretative play that animates Arendt’s writing (and 
which makes it so often appear frustrating or self-contradictory to unattuned 
readers), subjecting it to a literalist reading that reduces her insights to 
propositional logic. It is in this connection that the value of Marie Luise 
Knott’s Unlearning with Hannah Arendt emerges most clearly. In a connected 
series of essays on ‘Laughter’, ‘Translation’, ‘Forgiveness’, and ‘Dramatization’, 
Knott adroitly traces Arendt’s concern for language’s ability to sustain thinking 
within the crisis of the political in modernity, a concern shared with a line 
of thinkers and poets that reaches from Nietzsche and Rilke through Brecht 
and Benjamin to figures such as Nathalie Sarraute and Ingeborg Bachmann. 
 Knott follows this concern back to Arendt’s witnessing the intellectual 
collapse following Hitler’s rise to power, when she endured ‘the excruciating 
experience of watching her intellectual friends become gleichgeschaltet’ 
[coordinated] with National Socialism (p20). But as Knott recounts, it 
became inescapable in the face of ‘the genocide of the Jews [which] could 
not be comprehended by any existing political categories or judged by any 
existing judicial instruments’ (p61). This rupture convinced Arendt of the 
necessity of what Knott terms ‘unlearning’, a ‘g[iving] up’ and ‘reconceiv[ing]’ 
(p60) that would attempt to ‘comprehend modern experience’ without the 
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support of ‘traditional concepts’ (p59). Arendt ‘wanted to comprehend the 
world as it actually presented itself instead of limiting herself to what could 
be understood, in the sense of “deduced”, from preconceived ideas, existing 
worldviews, or all the precious small and large lies we cling to’ (p21). Arendt’s 
stylistic choices reflect this impulse, notably her use of familiar English 
words in quite specialised and nonstandard ways, so that new meanings are 
developed and explored across texts and in different contexts. As Knott writes, 
‘the positing of her own concepts and metaphors is exactly what lends specific 
weight to what is new and fresh in her thinking’ (p46).
 The central term that Arendt refunctions in articulating her conception 
of the banality of evil is ‘thinking’. Stangneth uses the term in the standard 
way: as mental activity or, more strongly, as ratiocination. Hence she refers to 
Eichmann’s ‘thought’ (p198) and his ‘thinking’ (p276), and describes National 
Socialism as ‘fundamentalist thought’, ‘totalitarian thought’ (p222), as ‘a 
complete system of thought’, and as a mode of ‘political thinking’ (p268). 
As a result, she takes Arendt’s judgment that Eichmann was unable to think 
as recklessly dismissive of his commitment to National Socialist ideology and 
blind to his relentless investment of mental energy in fashioning, rationalizing, 
and revising his various personae, justifications, alibis, recollections, and 
disquisitions. He may have talked in clichés, but, Stangneth counters, he made 
‘clever use’ of them (p96). The problem is that Stangneth wholly disregards 
Arendt’s idiosyncratic usage of the term ‘thinking’, a usage that is designed 
not to defend philosophy against pseudo-philosophical ideologies but to 
identify a much broader and entrenched danger in modernity’s atomisation 
and social disintegration.
 Arendt’s usage is fleshed out in her 1964 interview with Joachim Fest, which 
is included in the Melville House collection. Her conception of thinking ‘isn’t 
technical’ in the sense of demanding philosophical knowledge, training, or 
terminology, but is ‘a kind of which anyone is capable’ (p58). She elaborates 
by rehearsing a story told by Ernst Jünger in his diaries of World War II 
about a German peasant who is repulsed by the sight of starving Russian 
prisoners: ‘they’re subhuman … like cattle! … They eat the pig’s food’ (p48). 
For Arendt this statement exemplifies the absence of thinking not because 
it proceeds outside accredited philosophical paradigms - after all, she had 
witnessed her intellectual peers expressing equivalent opinions in the period 
of Gleichschaltung [coordination] - nor because it lacks a recognisable pattern 
of ratiocination, in this case the deduction of an abstract characterological 
quality from empirically observable evidence. It is ‘thoughtless’ because of 
its liquidation of the intersubjective reflectiveness that for Arendt defines 
‘thinking’, the requirement ‘as Kant says … “to think in the place of every 
other person”’ (p49). As Arendt observes, ‘the man doesn’t see that this is 
what starving people do, right? And anyone would behave like that’ (p48).
 Arendt’s conception of thinking in fact depends on a more socially 
embedded and less abstractly universal positioning than this allusion to Kant 
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suggests. It fully makes sense only in the context of her account of ‘social 
texture’ developed in chapter 9 of The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) and its 
re-articulation along the axes of ‘speech’ and ‘action’ in The Human Condition 
(1958). In contrast to the Enlightenment’s grounding of political community 
in the social contract forged between atomised subjects, Arendt’s conception 
of ‘social texture’ provides an intersubjective conception of human personality 
and agency by way of a quasi-Hegelian framework of recognition.4 As Andrew 
Buchwalter puts it, ‘communal substance [depends] on the experience of 
subjective reflection’, and, conversely, political community substantiates the 
subject’s reflexive ‘opinion’ and ‘action’.5 This is why Arendt argues that ‘the 
fundamental deprivation of human rights is manifested first and above all in 
the deprivation of a place in the world which makes opinions significant and 
actions effective’, a fate endured by the inmates of the Lager so powerfully 
described by Primo Levi.6 That is, ‘opinion’ and ‘action’ are not properties 
of pre-existing subjects but dispositions of subjectivity that take place in and 
constitute the ‘between’ of the ‘world’ – or, as she puts it in her interview with 
Günther Gaus, ‘the space in which things become public’ (p34). For Arendt, 
then, thinking is not merely organised mental activity or ratiocination but 
the engagement of consciousness in the difficult intersubjectivity of mutual 
recognition. As she says in her interview with Roger Errera, ‘to think always 
means to think critically. And to think critically is always to be hostile’ (p123). 
‘Thinking’ in this sense is the responsibility of consciousness to be ‘hostile’ 
to itself. 
 In fact, if we fold this usage back into Stangneth’s historical reconstruction, 
her account becomes surprisingly compatible with the evaluative framework 
she criticises. Stangneth writes of Eichmann that ‘it didn’t occur to him that 
some people found days other than those at the end of the war “calamitous”’ 
(p273); she notes with bitter irony that he ‘refers in all seriousness’ to the 
transports of children to the death camps ‘as the “children’s story”’ (p280); 
and, again ironically, observes that ‘Eichmann … had clearly forgotten that 
the “enemy powers” [that is, the Jewish civilian populations destined for 
extermination] had been defenceless, frightened humans, and that he had 
been chauffeur-driven to their annihilation in a warm winter coat’ (p279). 
More systematically, her identification of Eichmann’s need for frameworks of 
justification ‘that allowed his actions to seem “right”’ (p221) is in fact deeply 
consonant with Arendt’s analysis of his ‘thoughtlessness’: this is not ‘thinking’ 
but its liquidation.
 Despite this striking compatibility, however, there is a difference at stake 
here. This becomes evident in Stangneth’s formulation that ‘the reason 
Eichmann was so receptive to the totalitarian system was that he was already 
in thrall to totalitarian thought’ (p222). For Stangneth, Eichmann’s alignment 
with ‘a complete system of thought’ (p268) predisposed him to the totalitarian 
project of National Socialism. In which case, the danger is localised in 
‘totalitarian thought’ or the toxicity of certain modalities of ideology, and 
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by extension the remedy is located at the level of opposing, and providing 
alternatives to, such systematic and all-encompassing ideologies. Arendt’s 
vision, however, is much more expansive and thus much more troubling. 
In Arendt’s terms, the problem is not ‘totalitarian thought’ per se - which 
of course is not ‘thinking’ in her sense at all. The problem is rather the 
disposition of atomised subjectivity under the disintegration of social texture, 
which tends to substitute identification with ‘unworldly’ dynamics for the 
reflective intersubjectivity of thinking. Such dynamics may indeed take the 
form of structured and systematic ideologies like National Socialism, but 
they might just as well articulate themselves through porous, fragmentary 
and flexible discourses of self-affirmation, self-expression, secularism or the 
defence of liberal values and a freedom that is not free. For Stangneth, the 
problem is the lie of National Socialism, whereas for Arendt it is the lies we 
tell ourselves.
 If Stangneth’s Eichmann Before Jerusalem does not ‘permanently challeng[e] 
Hannah Arendt’s notion of the “banality of evil”’, its contribution to our 
understanding of the figure of Eichmann is indisputable. Yet if we attend to 
Benjamin’s conception of the historicity of interpretation, Stangneth’s study 
also helps to refine and reformulate our conception of the banality of evil by 
pointing to its imbrication in the intersubjectivity of social texture and its crisis 
in modernity. As Arendt tells Joachim Fest, Eichmann ‘wanted to say “we”‘ 
but without the reflective processes of ‘discussing things together, reaching 
certain decisions, accepting responsibility, [and] thinking about what we are 
doing’ required by political action. And this was ‘quite enough to make the 
greatest of all crimes possible’ (pp43-44).
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